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Abstract— this paper outlines the infrastructure required for a 
penetration testing suite centered around the cellular call control 
protocol called Diameter.  A brief description of Diameter is 
given along with the basic equipment and design requirements to 
conduct the testing. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a framework for a 
detailed security analysis of the Diameter Protocol and the 
platforms that carry this protocol.  There is very little 
information on the protocol aside from a series of Requests for 
Comment, Standards Body Documentation and Industry White 
Papers.   It is critical that the framework not only examines the 
Diameter Protocol in isolation, but in system as well.  This is to 
show the interaction between Diameter and the various cellular 
radio systems, handsets, Provisioning gateways (P-Gateway), 
Serving Gateway (S-Gateway), Policy, Charging and Routing 
Function (PCRF) Gateways and the base stations (eNodeB) as 
well.  This paper sets up the base system to conduct detailed 
analysis of the Diameter Protocol from a Security Perspective. 
II. DIAMETER 
The Diameter model is a base protocol and a set of 
applications. The base protocol provides common functionality 
to the supported applications.  The base protocol defines the 
basic Diameter message format. Data is carried within a 
Diameter message as a collection of Attribute Value Pairs 
(AVPs). An AVP is like a RADIUS attribute. An AVP consists 
of multiple fields: an AVP Code, a Length, some Flags, and 
Data. Some AVPs are used by the Diameter base protocol; 
other AVPs are intended for the Diameter application while yet 
others may be used by the higher-level end-system application 
that employs Diameter. 1 
A number of working groups have specified their 
requirements for Authorization, Authentication and Accounting 
(AAA) protocols, and these requirements drove the design of 
the Diameter protocol. The Roaming Operations (ROAMOPS) 
Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
published a set of requirements for roaming networks. The 
NAS Requirements (NASREQ) Working Group of the IETF 
                                                          
1 Interlink Networks. (2002). Introduction to Diameter.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.interlinknetworks.com/whitepapers/Introduction_to_Diameter.pdf 
documented the next generation NAS AAA requirements. The 
Mobile IP Working Group of the IETF documented AAA 
requirements that would help Mobile IP scale for Inter-Domain 
mobility. The Telecommunication Industry Association (TIA) 
TR-45.6 Adjunct Wireless Packet Data Technology working 
group documented the CDMA2000 Wireless Data 
Requirements for Authorization, Authentication and 
Accounting (AAA). Based on the work of TR-45.6, 3GPP2 has 
specified a two phased architecture for supporting Wireless IP 
networking based on IETF protocols; the second phase 
requiring AAA functionality not supportable in RADIUS. The 
design of Diameter met the requirements indicated by these 
various groups.2 
III. THE RELAVENCE OF THE DIAMETER PROTOCOL 
Diameter is important as it subsumes the Signaling System 
Seven (SS7) system that was responsible for signaling and 
control in Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN) and 
was the intelligent signaling layer in Time Division 
Multiplexing (TDM) networks.  SS7, a very important and long 
living protocol, is being replaced in modern cellular networks 
by two protocols: Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and 
Diameter. SIP is the call control protocol used to establish 
voice, messaging and multimedia communication sessions. 
Diameter is used to exchange subscriber profiles, 
authentication, billing, Quality of Service (QoS) and 
mobility—between the network elements in these systems. The 
subscriber profile information handles issues such as network 
join, location updates and subscriber data, voice, video or 
multimedia sessions. This information is routed between 
visited and home networks to authenticate and enable services 
for roaming subscribers.  Diameter signaling is used between 
the elements in a service provider’s 4G network and between 
providers and roaming hubs. There is a large body of Diameter 
interfaces that have been defined by various industry and 
standards groups.  Diameter is a extremely flexible standard, 
which is both it’s strength, as it allows very quick development, 
and it’s weakness, as it tends to be somewhat unfinished, 
cannot scale without help and has little, if any, academic work 
on the security posture of the protocol ecosystem itself.3 
                                                          
2 Interlink Networks. (2002). Introduction to Diameter.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.interlinknetworks.com/whitepapers/Introduction_to_Diameter.pdf 
3 Acme Packet. (2012). Scaling Diameter in LTE and IMS,  Retrieved from: 
http://ws.lteconference.com/wpcontent/uploads/1120APKT_WP_ScalingDia
meter_020112.pdf 
IV. DIAMETER AND MOBILITY 
Diameter signaling puts significant demands on the mobile 
network. The main challenges that service providers face with 
scaling, security and managing Diameter in Long Term 
Evolution (LTE) and IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) 
networks include: 
• Traffic volume: The volume of messages and Diameter 
transactions for each voice or data session can be huge. By 
2015, the firm Exact Ventures projects a figure of 235,000 
transactions per second (TPS) for every one million 
subscribers.  For a moderately sized LTE deployment of five 
million subscribers, a mobile service provider will require 
Diameter transaction processing in the range of 220,000 to over 
one million TPS. 4 
• Overload and network failure: The servers involved in 
processing various AAA, QoS or charging functions are not 
equipped to deal with spikes in volume; this can impact service 
quality or network availability due to element overload and 
failure.  This is a key security concern. 
• Network attack: Diameter signaling infrastructure that is 
exposed to external networks in roaming scenarios can be 
attacked in two major ways.  The first is with a denial of 
service attack.  With Diameter pooling the information 
exchange used for signaling, if attack the Diameter Border 
Controllers, this can degrade or possibly take down the entire 
4G network.  A more insidious attack would be the interception 
of Attribute Value Pair and location information.  Information 
can easily be sniffed on untrusted, public IP transport networks 
between service providers.5   In fact, Wireshark has a detailed 
Diameter template within their sniffer product to do just that.   
The security theme here is not only can subtle attacks be made 
on the 4G system (similar to the ones made on its predecessor 
SS7),  but the distributed nature of the 4G network makes it 
uniquely vulnerable to “script kiddie” like Denial of Service 
attacks.  
V. IP MULTIMEDIA SUBSYSTEM (IMS) 
Unfortunately, the cellular network which Diameter is 
applied is moderately complex.  This section of the paper gives 
a very basic discussion of platforms and what they do in the 
IMS ecosystem.  Figure 1 shows the basic functions of the IMS 
system. This diagram shows that a user equipment device (a 
mobile phone in this example) is calling another device (a 
landline telephone). The User Equipment (UE) sends its 
connection request (an invite) to the proxy call session control 
function (P-CSCF). The P-CSCF needs to find the call server 
so it sends a request to the interrogatory call session control 
server (I-CSCF). The I-CSCF contacts the home subscriber 
server (HSS) which contains the service profile of user and the 
location of the serving call session control function (S-CSCF). 
The S-CSCF will then manage the communication session with 
                                                          
4 Acme Packet. (2012). Scaling Diameter in LTE and IMS,  Retrieved from: 
http://ws.lteconference.com/wpcontent/uploads/1120APKT_WP_ScalingDia
meter_020112.pdf 
5 Acme Packet. (2012). Scaling Diameter in LTE and IMS,  Retrieved from: 
http://ws.lteconference.com/wpcontent/uploads/1120APKT_WP_ScalingDia
meter_020112.pdf 
the UE through the P-CSCF. The IMS system can then connect 
a call through a media gateway (signaling processes not shown) 
so the connection can reach the landline telephone.6 
• The relevance of this discussion is that the 4G 
network is not a closed system like the PSTN was.  It 
is growing up with even more open standards than the 
Transmission Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
based networks that formed the Internet.  This is one 
of the reasons that cellular infrastructure can be 
brought to market extremely quickly, it is also a 
reason that security holes may be formed at the seams 
of the actual infrastructure the cellular carriers are 
deploying.  Currently, mobile security is focused on 
handheld and user interaction and that are probably a 
good development as the user devices themselves are 
very insecure, but there is the possibility of easily 
exploited vulnerabilities within the actual base station 
and IMS/LTE infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  IP Multimedia Subsystem7 
VI. DIAMETER AS A LAYER 
Diameter sits above the transport layer when placed in the 
OSI (Opens Systems Interconnection) layered architecture. It 
uses the transport services provided by either TCP or SCTP 
layers, which in turn use IP as their layer below as illustrated in 
Figure 2.   This is significant because the vast majority of tools 
and talent are focused at Layer 7 issues such as stack overflows 
and other software design issues or network based issues such 
as Layer 4 port management and network flows.   Being above 
Layer 4 and below layer 7, Diameter is in a very difficult 
position on the OSI stack for IT managers to deal with as a 
matter of culture. This is because the vast majority of people in 
the IT industry are trained to look at issues at Layers 3 and 
below (Networkers), 3, 4 and 7 (Programmers and most 
Security Personnel) and Layer 1 and 2 (Telecom and Fiber).  
                                                          
6 VoIP Dictionary. IP Multimedia Subsystem - IMS 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.voipdictionary.com/VoIP_Dictionary_IMS_Definition.html 
7 VoIP Dictionary IP Multimedia Subsystem – IMS 
Retrived from: 
http://www.voipdictionary.com/VoIP_Dictionary_IMS_Definition.html 
 
The pool of people that understand session and presentation 
layer issues are somewhat small; the pool of people that 
understand the security interactions smaller still. A very 
interesting issue is appearing in the mobile network. The 
nervous system of this infrastructure seems to be moving to a 
portion of the IT ecosystem that IT managers are least prepared 
to cope with.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Diameter as a Layer8 
VII. LONG TERM EVOLUTION (LTE) 
LTE is an evolution of the IMS system that simplifies the 
platforms required to provide 4G services.  The first major 
component is the eNodeB, a base station radio. The second 
major component is mobility management entity (MME), 
which is the brains of the system.  The third is the System 
Architecture Evolution – Gateway (SAE-GW) which is a very 
fast user plane router.  The Policy and Control Routing 
Function and the Host Subscriber Service are critical to track 
billing and QoS considerations.  Figure 3 - LTE Architecture 
illustrates this arrangement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 N. Kottapalli (2010),  Radisys White Paper:  Diameter and LTE Evolved 
Packet System.  http://go.radisys.com/rs/radisys/images/paper-lte-diameter-
eps.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  LTE Architecture9 
The protocol used here is Diameter which allows these 
subsystems to communicate.  This creates an interesting 
security situation as Layer 4 (transport) through than Layer 6 
(presentation) now have significant policy and control 
implications that were previously reserved at Layer 3 and 
Layer 4.   As mobile networks like LTE move into vogue, we 
shall see that the securing of this protocol and the platforms 
that aggregate it and transport it around the cellular system will 
be a significant effort.  
VIII. EQUIPMENT REQUIRED10,11 
The effort breaks down into two phases.  Phase I creates a 
Server running Virtualization Software with a target Open 
Source Diameter Server installed on it.  A system that meets 
the target box specifications appears in Table 1 (Phase I Bill of 
Materials for Target Box). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Event Helix (2010). Long Term Evolution (LTE) Overview, Retrieved from: 
http://www.eventhelix.com/lte/tutorial/lte_overview.pdf 
10 Rapid7 (2011)  “How to Create a Penetration Lab”,  Retrieved from:  
http://www.metasploit.com 
11 The information at the Metasploit Website was invaluable to the creation of 
this equipment list.  See the article “How to Create a Penetration Lab” at 
http://www.metasploit.com 
 
 
TABLE I.  PHASE I BILL OF MATERIALS FOR TARGET BOX 
Target System 
Subsystem Specification 
Processor Intel Core 2 Quad 
@2.66 GHz 
Memory 8 GB Crucial DDR3 
RAM 
Hard Drive 500 GB HD 
Network 
Cards 
2 Gigabit Ethernet 
NICS 
Operating 
System 
Ubuntu 10.04 LTS 64 
bit 
Virtualization 
Software 
VMware Workstation 
Target 
Software 
Open Diameter 
Software 
 
A system that meets the attack system specifications is 
listed in Table 2 (Phase I Bill of Materials for Attack Box). 
 
TABLE II.  PHASE I BILL OF MATERIALS FOR ATTACK BOX 
Attacking System 
Subsystem Specification 
Processor Multiple Core 
Memory 8 GB DDR3 RAM 
Hard Drive 500 GB HD 
Operating 
System 
Ubuntu 9.10 64 bit 
Network 
Cards 
1 Gigabit Ethernet NICS 
Virtualization 
Software 
VMware Workstation (or Virtual 
Box) 
Attack 
Software 
Metasploit Framework (and/or 
Core Impact) 
Wireshark 
Backtrack 5 
Pre-built virtual machines or 
installer ISOs 
 
IX. EQUIPMENT SET UP OF TARGET DIAMETER SYSTEM – 
PHASE  I 
Figure 4 (Phase I Diameter Lab) shows the Phase I lab 
environment.  This is the bare bones setup and will be used 
mostly to get the Diameter System up and accessible through 
the VM in the attack box and to make sure that the correct tools 
to do initial Penetration Test runs are set up. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Phase I Diameter Lab 
X. EQUIPMENT SET UP OF TARGET DIAMETER SYSTEM – 
PHASE  II 
Once the environment is set up, it is then necessary to add 
Virtualized and/or simulated elements of the LTE 4G system of 
systems.  The critical ones are the Policy and Charging Rules 
Function (PCRF), the Host Subscriber Service (HSS) and 
Mobility Management Entity (MME)   Figure 5 shows the 
topology of the second phase of the lab setup. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Phase II Diameter Lab 
 
 
 
 
XI. VULNERABILITY IDENTIFICATION 
A list of potential system vulnerabilities must be created 
from this effort.  In an extremely useful paper, Securing SS7 
Telecommunications Networks by Lorenz, et al. presents an 
excellent taxonomy for security vulnerabilities in the call 
control subsystem of the Public Switched Telephone Network 
(PSTN).  That taxonomy appears in Figure 6 – SS7 
Taxonomy12.  This paper proposes the creation of an analogous 
taxonomy from the SS7 work in the examination of Diameter 
vulnerabilities as a first deliverable of this system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XII. CONCLUSION 
Diameter is subsuming SS7 for call control. It is very likely 
to subsume RADIUS and TACACS+ for general purpose 
Authorization, Accounting, and Authentication (AAA) services 
as well.  A list of potential system vulnerabilities will be 
created from this effort using a similar effort as the SS7 
Security Taxonomy shown in Securing SS7 
Telecommunications Networks.  Currently the security 
research on Diameter is extremely thin, mirroring the situation 
in the 1980s and 1990s with SS7.  With mobile computing 
becoming so ubiquitous and the richness and importance of 
data at a much higher level than what was comparatively 
                                                          
12  G. Lorenz, T. Moore, G. Manes, J. Hale, S. Shenoi, Securing SS7 
Telecommunications Networks,    Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Workshop on 
Information Assurance and Security,  United States Military Academy, West 
Point, NY, 5 - 6 June 2001 
 
passed over the SS7 based Public Switched Telephone 
Network, it makes sense to start building a capability now that 
can look into this issue of Diameter Security. 
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